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1. Introduction 
Background 
Banking is one of the most regulated industries in the world. The growth of various type of 
regulations commenced after the last global financial crisis in 2007-2008 to enhance the 
monetary systems’ stability and reduce the future negative impacts on it. Regulations stead-
ily evolved, beginning from imposing post-crisis liquidity standards, capital adequacy and 
solvency regulations, demanding higher capitalization requirements from banks.  
There is no sign that the needs and demands from the monetary environment may be de-
creased - the number of regulations growth [1], by creating new or changes to existing ones, 
gross up globally to ca 200 changes per day [7, 10]. Moreover, previously only local de-
mands have now expanded into cross-border obligations and not abiding them is not an 
option due to several accompanying fines, possibility to lose the trust of clients, partners 
and banking licence. Hence the immensely rising appetite of the regulators is understandable 
approach and directly correlated with the bank’s growing burden of analyses, assessments 
and reports to be created on the internally and externally gathered data, the imposed fines 
and more stringent rules do not seem to mitigate the existing problems - slow adaptation of 
current systems to catch criminal activities effectively on spot.  
The credit institutions cannot neglect any of the imposed reporting or adequacy duties and 
are obliged to find means to bear them. But as the accompanied compliance costs are not 
related to any specific product or service and cannot be therefore recuperated directly from 
the client as legal consultation expenses on loan agreement could, they do not create any 
direct profit for the bank.  
The expenditures expand when specialization of the bank involves cross-border client base 
because the regulatory compliance requires not just barely knowing and following interna-
tional laws and regulations but executing more enhanced interactions with applicable au-
thorities and additional frequent verification process driven communications with interna-
tional clients. This cannot be performed without the sustainable and advanced IT systems. 
According to Gartner’s research the forecast for credit institutions’ IT costs are estimated to 
be globally US$519 billion in current year [24]. 
By now formerly pure prudency has gradually grown into administrative crime spotting 
burden necessitating daily verification, monitoring and screening of customers and counter-
party data, accompanied with the pertinent all-embracing reporting to various authorities. 
To conform with all mandatory requirements banks had to employ specialists, compliance 
officers, who ensured that the enterprise followed all relevant and necessary laws, regula-
tions, directives and guidelines in duly manner and on time. To express the immensity of 
the problem - every medium bank in Europe had to input 200 full-time specialists to work 
[3] to comply with just one regulatory norm - the banking prudential regulatory reform in-
troduced to set minimum obligatory standards for international credit institutions - Basel III 
[2].  The growth in employment costs has been similar all over the world - according to 
Federal Financial Analytic research [4] the compliance costs in the United States have risen 
double comparing expenses in years 2007 and 2013. The responsibility for execution of all 
regulations in many jurisdictions is personal, which means that the compliance officers can 
be held personally liable, accompanied with enormous personal and institutional fines, if the 
credit institution they are responsible for fails to perform its obligations.  
The afore mentioned would be not necessary without the core focus of banking – the cus-
tomer, from whom the changed banking requirements to observe the anti- money laundering 
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and counter terrorist financing prevention demands several tedious and time consuming spe-
cific interactions, verification of owners, proof of funds, business plans and counterparties. 
This process is somewhat similar and yet different in every bank the client has an account 
in but yet cannot be simplified or unified due to the existing diversity of legal requirements 
and state’s capabilities across the regions. This has led to, as shown in the Thomson Reuters’ 
double survey on financial institutions and their corporate clients [6], to drastic reduce in 
customer experience as the involved paperwork in customer due diligence was too burden-
some and accompanied with noticeable rise in expenses which on average was US$60 mil-
lion annually per financial institution with peaks up to yearly US$500 million for some 
institutions on these obligations only.  
Besides regular technology development and labour expenses inside the bank, regulatory 
fines (in addition to the personal accountability and enormous fines against the responsible 
officer) upon defaults in complying with the regulations also may apply. These fines in their 
size can be enormous. For instance, to only one bank, the Deutsche Bank, for insufficiently 
following anti-money laundering regulations between 2011- 2015 the fines total size of 
US$600 million were issued by the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority [16] and 
the New York State Department of Financial Services in the United States [17] during 2017. 
McKinsey & Company has analysed the SNL Financial data and found that the operation 
income of 20 large US and EU universal banks has decreased by 10 % over 2009 – 2014, 
when the imposed regulatory fines have been growing almost 45 times [25]. Consequently, 
the costs on IT development and compliance employment are vital for avoidance of the fines 
and prevent the possible forfeiture of trust of customers and authorities or even business. 
Considering the aforementioned, it is not hard to foresee the escalations of future problems 
banks will encounter as their once costly sophisticated core systems with built-on attach-
ments and paper-based client interactions will fail to serve them well in the new complicate 
and challenging ecosystem of e-money, cloud-storage and distributed ledger technology.  
Concisely, the overgrowth of regulative burden, that involves collecting, verifying, analys-
ing, assessing and reporting particular customer data to the authorities, is distressing the 
credit institutions by (i) cumulating operational costs due to required IT investments and 
maintenance, (ii) creating lower customer satisfaction due to more extensive and expensive 
due diligence process, and (iii) risk of high fines in case of non-compliance; while the actual 
goal is to hold banks responsible for gatekeeper tasks for spotting and stopping money laun-
dering and tax evaders.  
Problem Statement 
The regulatory challenges banks encounter can be divided into three major areas that share 
similar grounds or purpose. First, are reforms which involve any kind of protection - assets 
or customers wise. These cover consumer and capital market protection, capital liquidity 
and resolution plans. Secondly, required standardization that incorporate the governance, 
consolidation measuring and statistics. Thirdly, and most challenging is the area of report-
ing, that involves accurate data on continuous monitoring of customers and their counter-
parties interactions, which formulates into applicable financial and crime reporting. 
Within the domain of regulations there finds two areas of reporting and the functions nec-
essary for their correct execution. The first, financial reporting incorporates forms of statis-
tical reporting that specifies besides numeric values customers’ name. This includes report-
ing to supervisory authorities on credits, collaterals, debts and deposits as well as local or 
cross-border change of tax information. Secondly, the financial crime that involves cus-
tomer due diligence, monitoring of customer’s pertinent activities to provide timely and 
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proper information of made findings to authorities (tax, supervisory, police, etc) for them to 
require more proof to find out and judge those customers or their counterparties who are 
engaged in illegal or suspicious activities. 
The distributed ledger technology or DLT, which also includes its sub-category - blockchain   
[5], has shown that its incorporated functions may appear as a potentially efficient game-
changer to defeat the current obstacles in attesting trust across the borders. Many bank con-
sortiums and authorities have closely followed this development and are already investing 
heavily in understanding how these technologies could be of use for dealing with payments, 
treasury, securities, confirmations and compliance to regulations. Current focus has been 
more on the technology’s essence itself rather than how this could improve processes of the 
credit institution. 
Therefore, in the light of the above context, the research question of this thesis is to explore 
how the distributed ledger technology with its subcategories, can innovate the compliance 
processes of the banking sector, provide new ways to securely overcome the banking indus-
try’s challenges in external reporting which are grounded on customer data and in unison 
improve the interaction experiences of customers and authorities to achieve the ultimate aim 
avoiding the states and banks being used for money laundering and terrorist financing, col-
lect more taxes and progress honest economy.  
The structure of this thesis by chapters is as follows: 
In the first chapter the background of the compliance and area challenges in the banking 
sector is conceptually outlined. It incorporates the explanation of the core of the banking 
compliance, involved terms and definitions, applicable regulations, requirements and chal-
lenges together with the possibilities the distributed ledger technology (including block-
chain) offers. The second chapter describes the current state and dependencies the average 
universal bank and its counterparties from customers to authorities encounter concerning 
customer due diligence, screening, monitoring, analysing, and crucial external reporting. 
The third chapter presents the analyse of the articles, researches and ongoing projects avail-
able on this relevant or similar issues describing how scientists and technology have and 
could solve these challenges and what obstacles they have encountered. The forth chapter 
provides the analyse of the solution to the necessary alterations of the current procedures 
with the aid of distributed ledger technology to advance the involvement in and quality of 
the process under surveillance effectively and securely for all parties. The fifth chapter out-
lines the discussion with founded opportunities, limitations and further possibilities. 
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2. Background 
This paragraph will introduce the background of the area challenges, current ways and ac-
tivities to accomplish intact with the concept of compliance and possible future measures to 
manage them with the aid of DLT.  
Area challenges 
The global financial environment (including Europe, Asia-Pacific, United States) has simi-
lar regulatory challenges for all credit institutions, outlined by FATF [33] mostly in eight 
areas: 
1) Financial crime - that include anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financ-
ing (AML/CTF) together with know-your-client (KYC), beneficial owner (BO) 
and/or ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) confirmations and several forms of cus-
tomer due diligence (CDD) according to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or 
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and 
the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval) standards that endorse global AML/CTF 
measures based on technical compliance and prompt reporting;  
2) Financial reporting - based on Basel III Pilar 3, International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS 9), Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act that orders credit institu-
tions to collect and report taxable data and if necessary, withhold and transfer taxes 
on US citizens (FATCA); similar aim to enhance taxation among member states of  
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has stipu-
lated to Common Reporting Standard (CRS), Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision and many more; 
3) Consumer protection – includes the OECD introduced basis for data protection [76] 
and protection of any kind of client’s rights such as deposit insurance and financial 
advice; 
4) Capital markets reform - involves market integrity, derivatives reform, capital mar-
kets integration, consortiums against shadow banking; 
5) Capital and liquidity issues - like stress testing, higher minimum capital require-
ments to improve the stability of the area; 
6) Resolution planning – that help to avoid vast damages in case the bank faces the 
insolvency; 
7) Risk transformation – as measures like corporate governance and risk management 
strengthening together with the controls and regulations on outsourcing and basic 
technology rules; 
8) Structural reform – as all the above involves different standards and data transfers, 
the standardization of numerous requirements (scope of business, priority sector tar-
gets, consolidation measures) is also necessary.  
This thesis will focus on the first two and data protection from the third challenge, which 
are interacted with each other very closely as involve the vital grounds for understanding 
the business and beneficial owners of the clients, analysing customers’ regular business by 
daily monitoring and screening the payments of customers and their counterparties to aid 
fighting and catching criminals and funds incorporated in money-laundering, corruption, 
fraud, tax evasion or terrorist financing schemes while protecting the data according to the 
legal regulations. 
Evolvement of compliance function 
To accomplish the above task in a structured and controlled way and stemming from the 
wish to “enhance the sound practices in banking industry” [26, 7] the Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision, which members are central banks and supervisory authorities, intro-
duced in 2005 [26] a new function, called compliance, inside the banks. This new function 
was to ensure all banks activities to be in compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
by identifying existing risks and implementing ways to mitigate them. 
At the beginning the compliance function could work together with the audit and delegate 
it’s tasks to that function. But with growing globalization and technology that allowed cross-
border high speed and automated payments the task forces responsible for prevention the 
money laundering and terrorist financing introduced gradually heightened requirements for 
banks. The latter was set out partly because the banks had the overall information on the 
clients and their regular behaviour and payments and partly because the state authorities did 
not have themselves grounds and resources for receiving and analysing that data. Conse-
quently, originated from the need to prevent money laundering and to aid following the set 
sanctions, the banking sector was strongly recommended to implement in their practices the 
risk management system’s model of three line of defences. In this model the compliance is 
responsible for the second line risk alignment controls over the acts of the operating man-
agement and business, which act as the first line. Internal or external audit provides leverage 
and independent validation of them both in the third line, requiring proof of activities from 
previous two line of defences.  
The essential of the compliance function has remained intact – to be the core risk manage-
ment of the bank accomplishing its business goals using available the systems in a lawful 
manner. Stemming from the above the credit institutions are required to set their risk appe-
tite in conformity with their possibilities managing the business without endangering the 
institution, clients, their funds and all relevant counterparties and compliance function 
should ensure that these risks are properly assessed and mitigated. 
Customer due diligence during onboarding 
The essence of banking is the customer. To mitigate the accompanied risks, the CDD pro-
cess must be executed by the bank to identify the customer, inevitable relations or interest 
with the bank’s region of activity, their ownership, business structure and relations in order 
to assess their suitability with the bank’s risk appetite to prevent money-laundering, terrorist 
financing and other fraudulent or criminal acts. To start the process of opening the bank 
account, the original documents or notarized/apostilled/translated/digitally verified copies 
need to be gathered and presented to the chosen bank together with necessary authentica-
tions of representative rights. In many regions the personal identification of the client by the 
bank official is a necessity. 
This is known as know-your-client (KYC) process that forms a part of CDD of every bank 
and is executed in the form of meetings and questionnaires answered by the potential cus-
tomer and accompanied with compulsory verified documents. Each bank is required to per-
form interview, check the filled KYC answers, verify their content against applicable regis-
tries identifying the applicant and ask more questions to specify the background of more 
profoundly. Necessary data should be inserted into the banking system to firstly assess the 
associated risks applicable to particular client, its owner of funds (UBO or BO with the 
ownership per centage different per region), business industry, geographical and political 
factors and from that score make the analyses to actual decision of onboarding or declina-
tion.  
According to Thomson Reuters Survey on KYC challenges in 2017, the onboarding process 
may averagely take nearly one month [27, 10] - all to effectively (and very often, not) 
onboard the customer. As the forms require more input from the customer, the time they 
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spend on onboarding, is averagely 5 days longer than for banks [27, 10]. The same Thomson 
Reuters KYC Survey has found that the average global number of contacts by the bank 
toward the corporate customers during onboarding is twice as high, 8 times, as for average 
for all customers (4 times respectively) and as cross-border companies have in an average 9 
different accounts in banks all over the world [27, 11], it is possible to see the overwhelming 
burden that lays on the customer as well than on the banks. In some regions the banks are 
obliged to report authorities the declined customers with applicable reasoning. 
During service 
After successful onboarding the frequency and content of customer interaction is dependent 
on the customer’s actual business risks. To accomplish assessment of those risks, the credit 
institution is obliged to screen all customers and their transactions parties on daily basis 
against relevant sanctions lists not to accept or send funds to restricted persons/organisa-
tions/countries, to monitor customers’ payments and actual financial behaviour against the 
estimations stated in KYC. The customer is regularly contacted if bank’s investigation 
shows ambiguities, if their data and or their UBO/ BO possession changes or if their KYCs 
or various forms or proofs of tax residency require updating. Such requirement does not 
apply to listed companies. Renewal of KYC is a regular obligation. The bank initiates this 
process prior the KYC’s validity term and upon spotted signs of deviations visible in regis-
tries, business pattern, geographical activity and ownership. In the latter cases the customer 
also is required to promptly notify the bank and documents completed at onboarding will be 
refilled, verified and exchanged again. 
Interactions 
The core of the reporting obligations is knowing the banks’ customers governance, origin 
of funds and business relations as precisely as possible. CDD process as continuously chang-
ing, requires unceasing back and forth interaction with all the counterparties, signing docu-
ments and checking the collected data regularly, verifying and inserting the gathered data 
into banks databases. Besides above responsibilities of the credit institutions, the combating 
money-laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regulations also places burden to all 
banks’ customers who are themselves obliged, before entering into the business contracts, 
to assure that their counterparties are not engaged in any criminal activities. In this challenge 
the clients currently mostly rely on the systems, analyses, screening and monitoring of the 
banks they use for banking, hoping that banks would buffer their business against offenders. 
Correspondingly to banks, the customers can be held liable as well if their due diligence on 
their business partners is found insufficient by the authorities.  
It is challenging also to authorities like, Financial Crimes Enforcement Networks (FinCEN) 
and Financial Intelligence Units (FIU, hereinafter together FIU), a special government 
agency (separate or part of police) that analyses the received suspicious activity reports 
(SAR, also known as Suspicious Transactions Report) from local banks, other similar units 
of affected countries and investigates the crimes related to money laundering and terrorist 
financing, tax evasion and other similar fraudulent acts or attempts, especially when the 
scale of the scams is global and requires swift actions to successfully trace and freeze crim-
inal assets. Ensuring the accuracy of law and order the authorities (including police, tax 
department) may require additional ad hoc and more in-depth information from the banks 
on their policies, their customers or the deals they investigate. In these cases, bank bearing 
the banking secrecy, has to gather and reveal more ad hoc data on this particular matter and 
as criminal law may be involved not reveal existence of the enquiry to client.  
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The scale of this task is global, as credit institutions, their customers and controlling author-
ities in all countries have the same challenges and obligations to serve in a trustful, secrecy 
protective and by correct way and means. To accomplish the latter the counterparties have 
been using several impartial intermediaries or bank-to-bank companies and country-based 
verification agencies or persons (notaries, sworn translators, local representatives, attor-
neys). These third parties may all use different and not well compatible technology within 
the country or region, but majority of the cross-border original or verified document sharing 
in CDD is done still on paper. These papers are kept within banks, oftentimes digitally du-
plicated for security reasons and for swifter response to ad hoc inquiries to FIUs. 
Distributed Ledger Technology 
The Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) incorporates many features that may aid over-
come the trust and verification problems existing in banking industry reporting require-
ments. According to the World Bank FinTech Note No 1 DLT “refers to a novel and fast-
evolving approach to recording and sharing data across multiple data stores (or ledgers)” 
[30, V]. This technology permits recoding and sharing of information in any form of data 
(numeric, binary, alphabetic, characters, etc) computer files (ledgers) in a unified (distrib-
uted and/or shared) way with all or certain participants of that database network. Beside 
previous access network, other added functionality layers can make the network more adapt-
able and flexible. With the aid smart contract program more data, like contracts, confirma-
tions, may be added in the form of layers (contract layer) to the existing DLT network. Also 
access rights can be determined to certain chains (control layer), network communication 
rules (communication layer), validation and verification instructions (consensus layer) and 
the form of acceptance of the core (content layer) addressed to the whole network [32, 10].  
The ledger can also be a permissioned type which would be run by a single or multiple 
consensus parties and which insertion rights are held by only certain participants [32, 9]. 
These partakers are, to the contrary to public ledger, identified and known to other partici-
pants and the validation process does not require as much of verification in the consensus 
protocol as the public one. Private ledger could be used within a company or group of com-
panies all over the world. As decentralized public approach necessitates for confirmation of 
trust the proof of work, the permissioned and centralized one, which is in control of its 
developers/owners, does not necessitate this type of proof because the members are joined 
only with approval and do not require extra trust from all joined members for every deal. 
The benefits the use DLT would provide is the rise in efficiency to all users, improvement 
of trust, security and swiftness in exchanging, verification, recording or reporting of data or 
actions with them. DLT would also enable “management of digital identity through public 
key cryptography” [31, 7].  
DLT is a broader term and has several subcategories created over the years. Blockchain, 
being the most investigated eminent subcategory of DLT, is a basic for cryptocurrency 
named Bitcoin [64], being probably one of the most known technology that uses DLT and 
blockchain “in which the ledger comprises “blocks” of transactions” [31, 1] and with peer 
partakers blocks joins in a form of a chain of verified links. Bitcoin, the first version of 
blockchain, enabling ownership and trade of digitized currency for deals over the internet, 
is run on public (permissionless) ledger allowing anyone pseudo- or anonymously to partic-
ipate with equal authority being an integral part of verification. The higher the number of 
participants, the pricier in energy consumption and costs is the consensus verification mech-
anism (proof of work, proof of stake, Byzantine) [89, 4] of the public ledger. The difference 
of blockchain is the feature that the content of inserted data can be only add-on, it is verified 
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by all required partakers, approval is fingerprinted with hash - an “authenticated by a cryp-
tographic signature” [31, 1], incorporated via technology to all other members past and fu-
ture ledgers and therefore cannot be changed without the consent of all or certain partici-
pants in real-time over internet. Verified block form an add-on chain conforming as a whole 
a trusted and open system. Therefore, the information stored on blocks is available to all 
partakers and the protocol, assuming the honesty of all partakers, incorporates the possibility 
that 51% of power owners of that chain could take over the system and reverse previous 
transactions [101].  
Besides blockchain, also newer forms of DLT have been invented to overcome the current 
performance slowness, expensiveness, inefficiency [91], “scalability, flexibility and gov-
ernance” [86] problems accompanying so called vertical blockchains. Such new ones are 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) elik Tangle, an open source DLT where transaction verifi-
cation and proof or work is more vertical nature, simplified and quicker [90] or patented 
private ledger DLT on Swirlds platform using for consensus a new method called Hashgraph 
[99] receiving consensus with dispersing information to haphazardly selected partakers in 
the form of “gossip and virtual voting” [75]. 
To regulate the growing DLT (including blockchain and other), there are missing regulator’s 
governing protocols and laws, as this technology is in early implementation, but the existing 
requirements on security and privacy apply to any of the systems used, including DLT where 
this is the case. But steps to achieve that have been taken by International Telecommunica-
tion Union on interoperability of DLT [93] and for financial services the Standards Australia 
has introduced roadmap on blockchain [92] as step to issue standard ISO/TC 307 for DLT 
and blockchain. Currently there is no unified agreed exact “criteria for determining what 
counts as a blockchain and what does not” [37,4], in order to distinct form cryptocurrency 
and focus on regulatory technology and solving the goal to combat fraud, in current thesis 
DLT term is used in a broad way to include all factors necessary for secure, immutable, 
traceable, scalable, stable and trustworthy regulatory reporting whether in a view of block 
or chain or not.  
By 2022 the projected infrastructure cost saving upon implementing the DLT in banking 
industry would be “between $15-20 billion per annum,“ as estimated by Wyman [1, 15]. 
Most known public distributed ledgers according to the World Bank [30, 14] are Bitcoin 
[64], Ethereum [65] and Litecoin [63] and of permissioned private distributed ledger is Hy-
perledger (found by Linux) [66], on grounds of which several technology companies and 
themselves or with collaboration of consortiums of other institutions have developed differ-
ent proficiencies offering  platforms like Hyperledger Fabric (by IBM) [67], Ripple [68], 
Sawtooth Lake (by Intel) [69] and Corda (by R3 CEV), presently the most known decen-
tralized DLT database platform [70]. Many of the latter announce incorporating consortium 
approach for attaining consensus [89,8]. Some of their possibilities are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Parties effected  
It is hard to pinpoint exactly how many banks, persons and companies are involved in total, 
but some picture could be drawn from the data available. According to the World Bank 
notice based on the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Access Survey 2016 the total 
number of the licensed banks and their customers globally is not very certain, aiming to 
more than 12,5 banks (including branches) to 100 000 adults in 2016 [8].  According to the 
global measurement of the financial inclusion, measured by the World Bank in their 2014 
survey [9], there are 2.24 billion private people, equalling to 62 [9, 4] percent of the adults 
of the world, who have a bank or mobile money account. According to the World Bank there 
12 
 
are 43192 [10] listed companies in the world in 2016 with total market capitalisation of 
US$64,853,776 million [11]. Regarding the number of smaller enterprises, it was according 
to the gatherings in 132 countries by the International Finance Corporation (World Bank 
Group) reports in 2010 that on average there are 31 enterprises per 1000 people [12, 3].   
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3. Current state 
3.1 Statutory Background of the Customer Due Diligence  
The aim of the CDD process is to follow relevant international regulations and standards 
that necessitate banks to know and verify their customers from their identity, ownership, 
activities, counterparties, business relations and transactions to source of funds. Neverthe-
less, their differentiations in their necessary reporting outcomes, the analysing methods of 
substantiation of the data for these reports has in many countries been left for the institutions 
to decide. Therefore, in this thesis, the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) recommended 
risk-based approach (RBA) guidelines of the banking industry [33] regarding activities in 
the anti-money laundering analyses, which allow the banks to assess and mitigate their ac-
companying risks, form the basis of the process descriptions. FATF “is an independent inter-
governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial sys-
tem against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction “[29]. Their guidelines are issued in the form of recommendations 
to countries authorities for ensuring that the institution under their supervision follows these 
rules and prevents criminal activities with the aid of their systems.  
Firstly, one aim is to prevent processing transactions to counterparties against whom en-
forcement acts have been imposed and therefore with whom the banks are aimed to block 
financial interactions. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the division of State 
Treasury of the USA, is one of the entity that sets out sanctions against persons, companies 
or groups who are “owned, controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries” 
[28]. Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) are exactly those persons, companies or groups 
against whom any sanction has been set. Their names are gathered in continuously updated 
watchlists against which the financial institution must screen all their clients, payments’ 
counterparties prior execution the transfers to find and verify actual hits and block such 
accounts or freeze payment funds and report accordingly to authorities/FIU in the form of 
SAR. Globally there are many other sanction lists (United Nations Sanctions, Australian 
Sanctions, UK Financial Sanctions, EU Financial Sanctions to name a few) besides OFAC, 
which all are obligated to be screened in relevant countries as it is not allowed doing busi-
ness with prohibited SDNs. Frozen funds should be kept unattainable for the SDN and trans-
ferred only upon relevant authority’s order. The client may be notified of such freeze and 
claims release from authority. Besides SDNs there are other different hits like politically 
exposed persons, their relatives, debarred parties, most wanted lists and similar. These hits 
should be as well evaluated, spot valid matches (name, birth date and place, nationality, ID, 
etc) and reject payments, if applicable.   
Secondly, the target is to be aware of the unusual activities via transaction, behavioural and 
typology-based monitoring among the executed payments of the customers, investigate the 
findings and escalate them accordingly based on their normal business and KYC estimates. 
The reporting outcome of this RBA classifies as reporting of financial crime (AML/CTF, 
suspicious transactions, etc) promptly after analysed and spotted in the form of SAR to FIU 
for investigate findings. The FIUs are performing also ad hoc investigations inside the banks 
on client’s transactions and their proof, based on applicable scenarios, suspicious actions 
and patterns. Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), a local authority which issues licences 
for and controls over the financial institutions within their region, performs regular and ad 
hoc checks to verify that their supervised banks procedures and actions are in compliance 
with all compulsory laws. 
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Thirdly, the regulations which demand collecting, verifying and reporting of precise facts 
depending on the outcome of the analysis versus the requirements on mandatory dates, also 
apply. In current work into the latter category the international tax related reporting, is po-
sitioned. First includes finding the persons of the United States of America (U.S. or United 
States) among clientele and their UBO/BOs and based on the grounds of international inter-
governmental agreements collecting and reporting taxable data and if necessary, withhold 
and transfer their taxes to the tax authority. The core idea for the U.S. is to get on hold of 
their citizens taxable assets located outside. Reporting is handled according to governmental 
agreements via local tax authorities or directly to United States revenue service institution. 
Reporting institutions (not limited to banks) are obligated to find out (currently without U.S. 
authorities help) on continuous basis stated possible indications that refers to the U.S. origin 
of private or corporate customers and their UBO/BOs, receive applicable verifications and 
filed tax forms via customer.  
Fourthly, similar obligation, but with different thresholds and without the withholding obli-
gation of payments is applicable in banking reporting according to the CRS, stipulated by 
OECD which aids its member countries to unravel shared obstacles and problems, to pin-
point their citizens (including companies and their beneficial owners) taxable assets outside 
their regular tax country. This regulation is obliging banks to find and pinpoint on OECD 
member state tax residents in cross-border tax information sharing project. It was introduced 
to accomplish the similar purpose to member countries as the United States intended with 
their FATCA. 
Finally, to comply with the preceding demands, the banks require systems, procedures 
(CDD, screening, monitoring, assessing, etc), analyse tools and quality data verified on var-
ious levels (clients, their UBO/BOs, local and international authorities, intermediaries, etc) 
to preserve their clients’ and regulators’ trust, data quality and lawfulness of business. 
3.2 Customer Due Diligence Process 
In the society where banks, in order to perform their CDD, have the possibilities to com-
municate with the client, state registries and intermediaries via electronic or postal ser-
vices/means and to assess the risks internally by electronic management from onboarding 
till termination of the client relationship, the typical and simplified internal workflow of 
CDD by Oracle [8, 10] on Figure 1 comprises of below.  
 
Figure 1. Oracle Know Your Customer workflow 
Potential customer risk rating 
The RBA approach primes to the applicably risk-adjusted CDD in accordance with their set 
business risk appetite and assessing potential customers, upon their such request or prior 
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entering into the business request offering, before onboarding. In order to set the right target, 
all customer provided documents and filled applicable questionnaires must be checked via 
state registries, trusted parties confirmations and all watchlists like different international 
sanctions, embargoes, business relations with sanctioned persons or with national and inter-
national politically exposed person (PEP - person who through entrusted/access public/po-
litical power could influence companies in order to benefit from corruption and their close 
family members and associates) as the business relations with sanctioned persons are for-
bidden and any such attempts or changes must be spotted, stopped swiftly and reported to 
FIU. If PEPs are involved, either directly with any position engaging decisive or beneficial 
power or via close family members or business activities and partners, the risk of this cus-
tomer automatically becomes high. This or any other risk class increase requires more fre-
quent and scrutinised checks and verifications of that customer stated as the enhanced due 
diligence (EDD) and in some regions also increases as inherited risk the risk-level of all 
related legal entities and privates. Each RBA institution regulates their onboarding and upon 
refusals many countries require reporting with rejection reasoning to authorities on regular 
basis. After considering potential customer suitable for onboarding, the CDD process in its 
entirety may start. 
The below Figure 2 is to reveal on the low level of detail the average dependencies of the 
CDD process for non-financial corporates regarding data verification, as this requires more 
analyses and substantiations than the private person’s account opening.  
 
Figure 2. KYC dependencies 
It is shown that roughly 2/3 of the information the company needs to present to the bank, is 
already in some form existing in the state-related or controlled entities and banks act just as 
collectors and controllers who need to evaluate this data and question the client in case of 
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controversies and preserve this all in an attachable form for future presentations to regula-
tors. One third of the information necessary for proper assessment comes directly from the 
client in the form of plans, estimations and data on their counterparties and related contracts. 
This combined with the gathered verified public data and results of the analyse is valued 
against the bank’s risk appetite scoring model.  
The bank is obligated to evaluate the inherent risks of the customer’s ownership structure, 
industry sector, origin of assets and business plans, hazards deriving from the geographical 
risk if their business, counterparties or owners or their close persons are PEP, sanctioned or 
origin from countries or regions identified as not having effective AML/CTF systems in 
place and how this all incorporates with the required services and products offered and chan-
nelled by the bank. All these findings and responses are stated in the scoring model associ-
ating the clients’ business risks according to linked risks and is part of the customer risk 
rating (CRR) model.   
The bank is required to assess and value all applicable risks as a whole, control and deliver 
an operative level of mitigation and refuse (and report) customers which direct and relational 
risk they judge not acceptable for bearing. The more publicly controlled the information 
about the customer is (listed companies), the lower the level of obligatory controls for credit 
institutions, as the control function is shared with the authorities and all parties exchange 
relevant data via extensive reporting. The younger the company, non-clear the business 
plans or vaguer and non-transparent the ownership structure, the higher the risk.  Many risks 
are also inherent, so for instance if the BO of the company becomes PEP, the company’s 
risk rating is automatically revalued. Depending on the risk associated with applicable cus-
tomer, the CDD process must be repeated regularly conditional on the stated risk rating or 
if any notification of the change or anomalies from estimations occur. If the customer is 
offering financial services and is therefore controlled by the respective regulatory authority, 
the information necessary for CDD is more extensive. In this case the same regulator has 
already at his disposal the expert data (not public) on particular licenced institution and the 
onboarding bank is just verifying this via the financial service providing customer. 
Similar as shown on Figure 2, applies to the private persons, but with small deviations - 
instead of balance sheet the differentiation of incomes is required, and the details mandatory 
for the corporates (business model, annual report, offered products, internal procedures) are 
not necessary. 
If bank is involved in the business with international clients, the capacity of tasks and risk 
rate rises as the verification and control methods are more uncertain and require more trusted 
3rd party proof of the background and lawfulness. The same applies to the client who is 
required to notify upon any required changes all relevant authorities and banks in all states 
they engage in with business.  Reports under study in this thesis all origin from the KYC 
process. 
3.3 Anti-Money Laundering Process 
The knowledge of the customer’s business, ownership structure and counterparties is re-
quired to map customer’s regular actions, estimated typical behaviour and spot any devia-
tions or abnormalities thereof. Among deviations the bank is obliged to identify these un-
common activities that may indicate a lead to money laundering, terrorist financing, fraud, 
tax evasion or crime, investigate these with due care, ask the customer to provide clarifica-
tions and proof of the lawfulness of those activities, counterparties or funds. If the analysis 
of performed investigation does not verify the legality of these activities or the customer 
refuses to deliver information, the bank is obliged to report this, without the customer’s 
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knowing, in form of SAR to the respective authority (FIU, Police) with accompanying doc-
uments - application, proof of analysis and investigations, account statement, signed agree-
ments, to name few.  
Figure 3 displays the dependencies in data sharing in AML process. The data collected by 
the bank in the CDD process is ranging from publicly available and known by authorities, 
to private business plans and estimations provided by the customer itself. The risk assess-
ment made on this knowledge and estimations is essential and this may alter due to behav-
ioural, geographical or any other relevant changes throughout the regular banking of every 
customer. The actual transactions, financial activities and their counterparty data executed 
via the bank is also considered private data not available to others. This data reflected 
through oftentimes compulsory scenarios stated by the local regulatory, FIU or other au-
thority, risk assessment patterns and watchlists that using screening and monitoring tools-
systems aid discovering particular customer’s abnormalities and suspicious transactions to 
prevent, seize and report illegal funds and activities effectively and promptly.  
 
Figure 3. AML/CTF reporting dependencies 
Bank’s obligation is to guarantee that all payments to SND customers and SND transaction 
counterparties are blocked and reported in SAR form. Same applies to all transactions that 
are made to, from or through the bank, and are for instance unusual for particular customer, 
to which the customer has not provided evidence or proof, which have large volume in bulk 
or in parts or which the banks know, believe or has reason to suspect criminal activities like 
money-laundering, terrorist financing or any fraud or crime. All systems involving the 
screening and monitoring of customers and their all transactions within the bank, their mod-
elling algorithms and techniques to spot alerts on transactions that require investigation, 
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need to be validated regularly by the bank. All investigations, as CDD and risk assessment 
and rating, require proof of trail for audit, compliance or external SAR or ad hoc reporting. 
SAR reports must be accompanied by the relevant agreements, customer data, account state-
ment and all proof gathered during the investigations. FIUs who receive and analyse SARs 
and FSAs who regulate and supervise credit and financial institutions cooperate closely 
across the borders and are therefore highly informed of suspected crime, persons and com-
panies who are under investigation or suspected to be engaged in financial crime, upcoming 
financial crime patterns in certain regions of the industry and developing measures to pre-
vent this financial crime. While banks have to rely on their gained experience, knowledge 
and sometimes gut feeling and still can observe only small piece in the puzzle. 
3.4 Tax reporting to the United States 
FATCA external reporting dependencies laid out on Figure 4 depict the workload of banks 
necessary to correctly follow the rules stated in the intergovernmental agreements. Banks, 
as financial institutions, are also obliged to register oneself with U.S. authority, discover and 
report year-end-basis the customers, their BOs and funds originated from the United States 
either directly to the IRS or to their local tax authority according to FATCA.  
 
  Figure 4. FATCA external reporting dependencies 
The actual reporting is based on the bank’s findings on relevant information related to the 
United States, called U.S. indicia. The latter is not complicated when U.S. indicia is deriving 
from the client’s assured tax residence, address or ID, but more challenging when the same 
has to derived from e-mail, phone or place of birth. Different thresholds and criteria apply 
for evaluating the business types, reportability volumes and reporting. The level of investi-
gations of KYC of trust corporations is more intricate and requires special analyse for 
19 
 
FATCA reporting purposes. The customer with spotted U.S. indicia has to, upon bank’s 
request, provide the bank with self-certification of its financial activity, different Internal 
Revenue Services (IRS, U.S. tax authority) signed forms to avoid withholding of tax rate 
from all U.S. originated funds, transfers and received interest or dividends on U.S. assets. 
In case the customer fails to provide proof within 90 days, the bank is obliged to withhold 
all funds the customer receives from U.S. sources. As the latter is very difficult to pinpoint 
and the fines for non-compliance are hefty, many banks refuse or have the right to close 
account, if the client is or becomes a FATCA reporting person. Listed companies are ex-
empted from FATCA reporting as their financials are public already.  
3.5 Tax reporting to OECD countries 
The banks, among other entities, are also obligated according to the implementation of 
OECD tax reporting standard [78] to clarify and report on all private, legal persons or their 
BOs, whose tax residence country is stated outside their reporting institution’s local and 
inside any of the countries joined CRS/OECD tax reporting. To accomplish this, the KYC 
and CDD must be performed and verified through authority public and client’s provided 
data confirmations.  
 
Figure 5. CRS external reporting dependencies 
Precise information has to be given regarding the investment income, account balances, 
sales proceeds gathered according to the clients’ entity and BO’s data. Reporting has to be 
performed on year-end basis to local tax authority separately on every distinct country (sep-
arately client and BO if their tax residence is different) for the easiest data transfer by the 
latter to respective country’s authority. The most common dependencies on this process are 
shown on the Figure 5. 
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4. Review of existing researches 
In this chapter of existing researches on DLT, including its subcategories (blockchain, Hash-
graph, DAG/Tangle), the applicable technology name is used what its founders of particular 
invention, service or consortium have stated as their ground technology. Nevertheless, the 
analyse itself has been executed keeping in mind broader DLT possibilities not to limit the 
solution only to one certain technology. 
 Existing projects in practice   
The publicly revealed existing projects that started to explore exploiting DLT and especially 
blockchain in the banking industry were at first mostly related to payments and settlement 
(already in live) and trade finance (several currently in test phases) due to their complex and 
time-consuming execution. In the latter for instance IBM corporation has formed several 
blockchain projects - for instance the Batavia project [13] concluded by five banks, industry 
experts and clients. Batavia is planned as a new platform based on smart contracts, encoded 
to blockchain, planned to ease noticeably currently very laborious interactions in the trade 
finance area.  Similar, blockchain with smart contracts, project but with the more partner 
banks with IBM we.trade (previously Digital Trade Chain Consortium) [14] is in test phase 
from February 2018.  
Projects in search of ways to enhance the current real-time gross settlement using DLT are 
also run by numerous fintech companies, banks and regulators - like Bank of Japan and 
European Central Bank in the Stella report [18] and project Ubin [19] by the Monetary Au-
thority of Singapore and the Association of Banks in Singapore. Corda permissioned need-
to-know basis platform on DLT has introduced among trade finance (letter of credit deal 
executed by HSCB and Dutch ING [83]) and cross-border payments correspondingly appli-
cation for AML and KYC purposes [50, 11]. Several authorities that advise European Com-
mission on their area – as European Banking Authority and European Securities and Mar-
kets Authority have opened discussion papers on their approach of the financial technology 
(FinTech) on the usability of DLT and/or blockchain. The recipients of the mandatory re-
ports - local FSA, Central Banks, Tax Authorities have been establishing secure platforms 
(sandboxes) where fintech and banking industry could securely find ways to efficient cur-
rently burdensome exchange of information. Extra initiative to find virtuous practise of in-
novative solutions comes from the financial technology companies to benefit under- or un-
served areas and the regulatory technology (regtech) finds [22] ways to assist financial in-
stitutions to solve their present difficulties and achieve the target in less consuming, cost-
effective, secure and efficient way.  
Ripple [60], a permissionless distributed ledger operation likely to private ledger, as is reg-
ulated by validators [89], provides almost instant payments to participants with many assets 
(commodities, credits, loyalty points etc) in existing numerous currencies and Ripple own 
cryptocurrency (XRP) on DLT. Ripple is integrated with financial institutions’ current sys-
tems. Transactions are cleared on the expense of customer provided deposit. It is stated that 
KYC and AML compliance is integrated into every transaction – by every gateway and 
Ripple promises to monitor payments (AML, fraud, sanctions) and report to regulators. The 
admittance to the monitoring processes and techniques is not accessible, but public infor-
mation confirms Ripple’s fine by FinCen on 2015 for not being compliant with AML/CTF 
monitoring obligations [82]. Open-source code Stellar which construction is federated Byz-
antine agreement (FBA) [61], uses above Ripple protocol, and is formed to introduce global 
network for monetary exchange. Stellar is decentralized, requires consensus and has there-
fore no single regulator. To ease the consensus handling, FBA introduced quorum slices and 
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slots, to which the participating nodes can diminish their requirement for asserting. As de-
centralized consensus is faced with ill-behaved, much of the power of the network is spent 
on proving the work which requires extensive amount expenses, time and other resources. 
Other projects that focus on AML/CTF only are not accessible yet, due to the confidentiality 
reasons and no DLT projects were spotted on cross-border tax reporting. But their core issue, 
KYC, has been incorporated into many projects and touches in their features also AML/CTF 
issues. 
Projects on KYC 
Relevant projects in exactly the thesis area is KYC-Chain [15], built a blockchain and man-
aged on DLT platform, for privates (using biometrics) and corporate customers to share their 
digital identity in a secure manner with financial institutions. Tangle [97], being a public 
ledger, descripted as “fundamentally different to blockchain” [98] has also declared that 
their setup of directed acyclic graph is projected to be used for ID wallet storing securely 
private data from health to identifications. Hedera Hashgraph, introduced innovative DLT 
has declared to offer AML and KYC compliance through their Opt-In Escrowed Identity 
system [100,25] allowing authority’s approved identity to be shared with parties only the 
customer specifically so intends. Upon transactions from customers account with Hedera, 
the counterparty bank can verify customers ID only if customer allows access to it. These 
approaches would ease the control systems across borders and upon trusted parties identifi-
cation this may ease the current process. Nevertheless, this requires a lot of unification set-
tlements.   
For global travellers the government of Canada has in collaboration with World Economic 
Forum and Accenture [47] built a prototype for travelers digital identity held on DLT hybrid 
ledger utilizing zero knowledge proof (ZKP) protocol, using Lewis’s [41] introduced self-
sovereign model which allows individual to be securely owner and sharer of his/her data 
however numerous contents of this (biometrics, bank details, passport number etc) are val-
idated by issuing authorities. To accomplish this liberal approach the use of permissioned 
public ledger has been indicated as most suitable. The identity data saving solution and per-
mission rights are currently open requiring more analyzes, whether to exploit DLT incorpo-
rated with blockchain, smart contracts or any other options. ZKP protocol is considered to 
bridge the privacy issues appearing in the DLT and blockchain as only the pointers to the 
sensitive information should be kept on DLT and not the actual data. This allows the partic-
ipants to prove that the information, verified by authorities, is correct and trustful while the 
secured database saves the identity’s signed parts of sensitive data and therefore the reten-
tion of private data would not be an impediment. Decentralized Identity Foundation [48], 
working together with Microsoft, Accenture and many others has used exactly zero-
knowledge databases to implement global decentralized identity using blockchain ID. Pos-
itive is, that this form of digital ID, if proved to be solidly protected, could be used also in 
regular KYC process.  
A report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser [39, 74] values highly the possi-
bility to enhance collaboration in different levels of assurance necessary for identification, 
cross-border business or proof of assets between the countries combining blockchain and 
public key infrastructure.  Among others also Government Asia has revealed their plans to 
run KYC process onto DLT/blockchain [77]. The banks can access via shared KYC platform 
the data verified by trusted parties with customers permission only. Upon changes or regular 
updates, the verifications are shared via KYC platform and relevant bank stores applicable 
records and outcomes for their mandatory reporting. The latter tactics would aid the clients 
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and banks to operative verification process but will not relieve the excessive reporting re-
quirements to the banks. At present such relevant standards and policies for secure infor-
mation exchange exist for the police and would be beneficial for all if such experience and 
cooperation on secure and legal way could expand the interoperability in governmental /mu-
nicipal authorities in and beyond state borders. Relevant method is exactly vital for rede-
signing the existing problems in stated processes especially in KYC and AML/CTF.  
State Bank of India has started a DLT/blockchain security protocol based on KYC platform 
BankChain [80] with currently 35 consortium members and 10 projects under development 
to ease the bank compliance from trade finance to private and corporate KYC and identity 
handling. The set-up is private single node system where the owner sets the rules and pro-
vides access. This method would work for the redesign of processes if the protocol is de-
cided by a consortium of regulators with possibility to change without damaging the existing 
system to achieve „cost reduction, while not losing the system control authority and 
initiative as is the goal of Korean Hana Bank in CDD enhancing project with collaboration 
with R3 CEV. As stated earlier, R3’s Corda is the leading DLT platform, founded specially 
to serve financial institutions heightened needs from customer onboarding till termination 
and reporting. Numerous respectable consortium participants from central banks and regu-
lators to financial institutions have also joined Corda to elaborate the exchange of securely 
trusted values and to grow out of “multiple generations of inefficient legacy technology” 
[94].  
Similarly has acted global intermediary, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tel-
ecommunication (SWIFT) providing the secure messaging system for its banking counter-
parties, starting their innovative programs from payments [20] to building a secure KYC 
platform [21], but this is not based on DLT nor blockchain and limited only for participating 
financial institutions. When considering the world wide digital identity scheme ID2020 [23] 
initiated by the United Nation, which objective is to give digital identity based on blockchain 
technology with the help of Microsoft and other organisations to those who have been not 
able to receive one in the first place, we can see that the field is growing and will quite soon 
be supported by more authorities. UN, being the trusted validator of given IDs, would able 
swift globalisation of identity approvals, permitting benefits of digitalisation and services to 
regions currently in lack.  
Existing researches 
DLT 
Hearn [95] introduces Corda as peer-to-peer network utilising secure data managed coordi-
nation in decentralized global ledger with possibilities for secure semi-private access man-
agement necessary for banking industry and interoperability with future and current systems 
and ledgers. Admission to the network is authorised by selected participant(s), identification 
solved by public key tie to identity with possibility to elaborate similar names for avoiding 
mismatches, transactions could be verified by selected notaries or regulators (in a system or 
in selected regional legislative area) and transaction related data like timestamp, signings, 
attachments or identity, organised not into blocks, therefore revealed only on need to know 
basis. Assets information flow could be organised automatically, preselecting relevant in-
formation to required parties with the help of flow framework providing trackers [95,11]. 
All the data in the ledger is saved in the vault in opposite to blockchain wallets. Partakers 
data is shifted to its vault automatically from ledger and vault is able to manage preschedule 
dealings, fact/identity storing, or other smart contract- based actions required for smooth 
management. Smart contracts, in Corda named CorDapps, entail in encrypted way the nec-
essary information for transaction execution, its triggers upon which occurrence the action 
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is automatically executed or not. Transactions history can be encrypted by Intel’s technol-
ogy named Software Guard Extensions to the extension that decryption is not possible even 
by Corda or holder of the transactions past ledger. The possibilities Corda provides with 
permissioned distributed ledger, would benefit aiding current difficulties if such an ecosys-
tem for customer’s identification, transfer and assets handling with accompanied fraud con-
trol and possibilities to interact to pre-agreed extent with similar ones globally is achieved 
without any secret back-doors. 
Patel [49] has described the utility of Global Correspondent Banking Registry for banks to 
ease the problems related to cross-border transfers and of similar global, but country specific 
KYC register for clients. The latter collects besides identity proof data also all transactions 
of particular client world- wide and thus creating an all-inclusive view for the participating 
bank (if originates, mediates or receives particular payment) to access this data via Global 
Correspondent Banking Registry with country specific KYC registry and assess their will-
ingness to conduct particular transaction beforehand to or with particular customer, compare 
this with other similar transactions data and conduct the payment even directly to benefi-
ciary’s bank, without using correspondent banks as current process requires. Same data 
would be available for regulators and FIU’s to analyze. This approach is good in changing 
the current SAR reporting as on one-to-one model and allows broader view of the customer 
and their soundness of business and spend more time on analyses than verifying the col-
lected data. But this would require unification of KYC collected data globally, solving the 
trust issues relating the information on registry with reputable 3rd parties and does not state 
the actual screening, analysis and reporting process relations with the regulators or banks. 
Same notification about unification and trustworthiness of data is pointed out by Staples et 
al [54]. 
The similar approach with permissioned DLT has been researched by Moyano and Ross 
[36]. They studied the possibilities of implementing centralized KYC process where finan-
cial institutions share their approval of verification of their client’s KYC via permissioned 
DLT, held and maintained by the local regulator, among each other. Clearing was planned 
to be managed with smart contracts, privacy guaranteed by the verifying bank storing the 
clients’ documents within its database sharing the cost of the verification anonymously and 
proportionately with other member banks. The system would be handled in two layers, one 
for customers and applications, the other -  a fabric layer, for member banks. Firstly, upon 
customer’s application a new account with public and private key would be created. Sec-
ondly, the analyse and verification is conducted by the bank with the help of customer’s 
documents and shared public key, while exchanging the relevant documentation outside the 
distributed ledger. Thirdly, when the customer is validated or rejected, the verifying bank 
saves the decision with executed process and analysed documents in digitally signed smart 
contract kept both in bank’s database and permissioned distributed ledger (fabric layer), but 
still attainable only to the customer and verifying bank. Fourthly, the verifying bank estab-
lishes smart contract with list of public keys future banking service provider of this customer 
could use to use the performed verification. A hash of all the documents the verifying bank 
produces are saved on the fabric layer, to provide more security for all involved parties. 
Authors “suggest that each bank uses a single, unique, one-payment-only account to interact 
with each customer” [36, 417] to provide secure interaction and privacy of participants. The 
above approach insures that a new bank who is interested in the particular verified customer 
is able to see how many public keys are in use and is able to receive its public key and 
benefit from the done verification only after it has compensated applicable proportional 
share of “the average price m conducting a core KYC verification process” [36, 417] via 
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cryptocurrency.  This process promises to reduce costs, encourage competitors’ collabora-
tion, elevate the competition on particular market and cooperation with local authority. In 
the sense of this thesis the above Moyano and Ross [36] approach would improve custom-
ers’ experience as it is one time only and gives the customer the control over permission 
(sharing keys) for sharing the access to the performed verification, benefit participating in-
stitutions in no minting as the verification can be shared only after proportional compensa-
tion. They also provide solutions to decentralize the KYC solution and not store analysed 
data on the fabric layer in case the regulator appears to be corrupt. As a weakness, this 
process does not consider that FATF’s methodology [79] does not encourage relying on 
competitors’ assessment, nor include risk rating and scoring of the customer and covers only 
the customer due diligence on onboarding (not mentioning future enhanced or any other 
regular due diligence necessary according to AML/CTF regulations). Also, if the verifica-
tion rules and agreed criteria are not set and their compliance not controlled by the regulator 
and participating banks, the outcome of verification can be a chaos due to the differences in 
RBAs, business approach, value level and risk appetite of the different banks, especially in 
the current setup of blind trust and anonymous cooperation. The compensation costs could 
also differ from the above reasons, the multiple storage difficulties (upon further CDD) and 
expenses and the restriction to only use cryptocurrency for payments can also limit the actual 
use of this type of KYC optimization process.   
Mills et al [102] have pointed out the potential of using DLT in settlement, including identity 
administration, storing and recording asset ownership together of executed transfers and 
controllers/regulators read-only access for regulatory reporting and compliance. This all is 
relevant also in current problem solving. 
Yang [52] has studied several technologies available for security and privacy in DLT and 
ZKP is one of them diminishing the soundness errors to smallest amount. This requires 
storing sensitive data verification from 3rd party and respective public data and interaction 
orders visible between those to effectively execute the transaction or deal. Besides above, 
identification hiding techniques like ring signature founded in 2001 by Rivest, Shamir and 
Tauman [53] can be used to create transactions on public ledger without identifying the 
sender. 
Subcategories of DLT 
As payments solutions need to include in- or outside the used system also anti-money laun-
dering tools, the business-to-business payments developed using DLT among the credit in-
stitutions is of great importance. As stated earlier, blockchain, being one possibility of cre-
ating distributed ledgers shareable for participants, not known to each other and therefore 
untrusted, on a network, should be also examined to find the best solution, nevertheless, 
many current projects and ventures fall under banking secrecy and are therefore in detail 
unapproachable yet. Buterin [96] has analysed possibilities of interoperation of different 
type of chains and their interaction strategy methods from parallel- and side chains with 
across triggers, arisen dependencies and validation possibilities. Easiest of which is through 
trusted and controlled notary positioned amid public and/or consortium chains. The option 
of relays, which gives different chains the same task, is not suitable in banking as verifica-
tions behind that could effortlessly made undistinguishable. If ledgers have similar consen-
sus and agreed governance, the interoperability would be much more efficient and trustful 
as is necessary to solve stated problems regarding relevant screening, monitoring and re-
porting.  
Yli-Huumo et al [101] researched blockchain technology, its limitations and possibilities to 
use it beyond cryptocurrency application as currently common. The potential range of usage 
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in different industries is wide. But the privacy and security, the most raised concerns of the 
decentralized environment and existing and unsolved problems with integrity, authentica-
tion, stolen privacy keys, vulnerability to obtained power majority overrun, could not suite 
as a whole (partially, yes) for solving current problems that necessitate security and privacy 
in many aspects.  
Pisa and Juden [37] have searched the advantages, challenges and possible usage of block-
chain technology in economy and refer to blockchain as an opportunity to generate distrib-
uted ledger on DLT as a protocol. Especially valuable regarding current topic reveals in 
their main aim to enhance the international cross-border payments, verification of identity 
and safeguarding the rights over assets. Their focus was to increase interoperability of cur-
rent bank ledgers while spotting and minimizing illicit actions regarding money-laundering. 
They have set out an example scenario where all transfers are executed on the distributed 
ledger accompanied with customer’s digital identification, so only the banks and participat-
ing customers could access this data and supervisors could have via digital dominant key to 
investigate these transactions according to subpoena. Authorities could also have the over-
look of the anonymous flow of transactions to spot suspicious activities in real-time and 
analyse relevant data to detect trends of crime [37, 22]. Pisa and Juden have studied existing 
solutions of IDs in Estonia and India and pointed out that currently “internet lacks an identity 
layer” [37,24]. This example would be a good option for spotting trends in data protective 
environment, but it is preserving the existing analyse and monitoring in banks who are not 
able to see the bigger picture and assess own risks according to their experience and 
knowledge only after the payments are executed and funds left the bank. 
Lewis on his blog Bits on Blocks [41] has introduced a simplified model of a self-sovereign 
identity which is created by the person to which the authorities provides further attestation, 
stored data is accessible over owner’s phone or chip similar to credit card and protected with 
public and private keys. Pisa and Juden have elaborated this to the identification possibilities 
in an identity wallet [37, 25, figure V] with authorities assertations on a blockchain that 
could be enhancing the collaboration between the client and credit institutions. The govern-
mental authorities approve name, gender, citizenship, marriage status of the owner of the 
wallet, employer his/her employment data and current bank his/her credit rating data. The 
owner of the wallet collects relevant accepted and approved data and shares this data only 
upon necessity with other banks with the aid of public and private keys. This should guar-
antee the privacy, traceability of relevant attributes and their records in the digital wallet. 
This approach could be very useful in public-private alliance ID2020 project to give digi-
talized identities to those private persons who due to various reasons are not provided by 
their birth or residence country valid identity. Houman Haddad [43], architect behind the 
Syrian refugees’ identity restoration with eye iris scan, held in a permissioned part of 
Ethereum blockchain under the UN sub-program World Food Program, confirming existing 
identity via UN existing regular database. The challenges stated in this client- based method 
encounters is the upholding of this system, approving authorities, especially when wallet 
owner has international business and requires wallet for company use as well, participation 
and input part both cost, reliability and trust wise. If owner or/and authority uploads false 
approval, it would definitely require honest and trustworthy supervisor or regulator who 
would validate the righteousness.  
Hybrid approach on identity related issues  
The main issue in global approach that states use different and sometimes similar and over-
lapping identifiers. The only current global identifier available for companies is Legal Entity 
Identifier (LEI) [44], endorsed after 2008 crisis by the Financial Stability Board [46] and 
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ministerial forum of European Union and other 19 states over the world (G20) [45] to sta-
bilize the economy over the world, use LEI to trace and report corporates and their securities 
trading. LEI 20-digit number incorporates also data about the corporates identification, 
group’s ownership structure and therefore comes of a benefit during the identification pro-
cess of KYC. R3 DLT project “is considering using the LEI as the primary identifier em-
bedded in its digital certificates” [44,24]. As the LEI’s issuance is costly for the customer, 
it is not available for privates and is valid only with certain terms, their usage as universal 
global identifier is currently not the case.  
Stemming from LEI, the securities transactions, that require instant reporting of transactions 
are forming the majority of in-live numerous DLT and blockchain platforms. Peters et al 
[58] researched the DLT usability in financial instrument and trade transaction transparency 
and reporting. They point out advantages of permissioned purpose-built ledgers (Hy-
perledger, Ripple, etc) was their compatibility with current systems handling off-chain as-
sets, achievable collaboration and consensus in amending rules, legal accountability and 
scalability. LEI, as required for financial transactions, is key in reporting. Hybrid-block-
chain held by full access right authority or consortium of financial institutions (access and 
amend their clients data upon changes) is suggested for company’s identification. Personal 
data would be secured in encrypted way on-chain accompanied with unique ID. If decen-
tralized ledger is used, the transactions would be kept on a private chain, to which the au-
thority’s access would be in predefined readable format. Peters et al approach, nevertheless 
meant for financial transactions reporting is valuable also in this research reporting to tax 
authority.  
Finextra blog [42] has covered interaction and existing data transfer possibilities of non-
DLT systems to DLT solutions, (as for instance) payments and securities settlement RIP-
PLE, onto DLT. This would require international legal entity identifier so all trusted partic-
ipants of permissioned /public / hybrid blockchain or ledger could amend necessary data 
and others could reach that data. Other relevant data like address, PEP, BO, tax residency, 
account details could also be stored in the wallet and banks, when assess alerts of money-
laundering, could evaluate instantly the received data and share the details of such transac-
tions to globally participating banks. This approach would be very useful in catching the 
actual transactions of money-laundering or terrorist financing, but as this does not alter the 
alert creating and assessing approach, the illicit funds would be long gone from wallet as 
the monitoring and SAR reporting takes time.  Therefore, if regulators and FIU’s would be 
connected to the system or have access to it, they would receive the information in early 
stage and seize the funds on the spot. This would require a lot of input from regulators, 
would revert their current post-action investigations of suspicious deals to possibilities to be 
able to pinpoint issues on spot and be viewing and analyzing possible trends in illicit activ-
ities. Similarly to above wallets, Corda customer vault could have the same possibility with-
out private data being spread across all participants. Interoperability of those approaches 
would broaden the possibilities in identity matching with transactions and enhance the spot-
ting of illicit attempts and transactions. 
Compliance options 
Stemming from raising compliance issues, Woodsome and Ramachandran [84] gathered 
researches of using DLT/blockchain in solving the money-laundering difficulties banks 
face. Referring to possibilities of structuring data on DLT, the term blockchain is stated as 
the method of data storage “such that the ledger retains the entire history of data modifica-
tions,“ [84, 48] which is accepted and stored by partakers in time-stamped linked blocks. 
Machine learning together with available big data analyses is encouraged for efficient risk 
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management and interaction between the banks, clients and FIUs in KYC and AML matters. 
Regulators and FIUs are reminded to lift some burden off over-regulated banks to limit the 
likelihood of shifting transactions services into less-regulated networks. This trend enlarges 
with technology development and banks stringier actions to mitigate risks and is one of the 
reasons why regulators should look forward towards risk shifting technology possibilities.  
Stark [51] has researched the possibilities using R3 Corda DLT applications for regulatory 
compliance in reporting obligatory information on interest swap transactions by building 
the reporting into the system and allowing, by the permission of the bank stated in specific 
Corda application CorApp, the regulators nodes to receive access to the relevant agreement, 
with verification by the designated notary node, directly after its conclusion. This method 
easies alterations upon changes in regulative demands and rules, allows actually more in-
formation sharing to regulators with lower costs, diminishes current data sharing that regu-
lators already should have access to and permits better regulatory confidence as the built-in 
conditional approach will not allow performance of any transactions unless all regulatory 
pre-conditions are met correctly. Regretfully, this scheme does not diminish monitoring 
analysis compulsory to banks. 
Besides reporting, the demands from authorities regarding data protection, rectifications and 
expired data retention have encouraged specialist to discuss on this matter due to DLT’s 
known immutability and complications accompanying with necessary amendments to in-
correct data. KWORI [55], Vranken [56] and Bacon [57,51] have pointed out the possibili-
ties to comply data protection in DLT. The banking law and DLT protocols are not yet very 
efficient for permissionless ledger, which upon the retention or any change could be exe-
cuted with collaboration of almost all the parties or their assigned group members. There-
fore, in current state the data requiring retention, should be stored on smart contracts (not 
visible to non-parties) without losing the scalability. Kosba et al [40] studied the version of 
increasing privacy, diminishing the data saved on blockchain with help of smart contracts 
in a protocol Hawk that requires ZKP (in the contrary to regular blockchain) and contains 
of two portions – on-chain public and contractual private (for sensitive data) – in the decen-
tralized cryptocurrency system overlooked by marginally trusted manager or trusted com-
puting hardware. Hawk framework usage was shown among other possibilities also on swap 
instruments where the manager would be stock-exchange and to guarantee the fairness in 
case one party cheats, the public collateral deposit. Analysed ways of leveraging different 
cases of corruption and unfairness could be used in future global networks for protecting 
parties active in public ledgers and also against counterparties to the contractual private 
ledger.   
Taxation solution on blockchain for personal taxi service like Uber in Denmark was studied 
by Warnez [59] with proposal to solve payment and correlated instant taxation via smart 
contracts using Danish Crown equivalent tokens swapped by the local central bank. Warnez 
prefers the local Tax Authority to govern the permissioned ledger as taxation is considered 
legal obligation and therefore the data protection could be handled according to the law. The 
Certificate Authority certificates in permissioned ledger allows the Tax Authority to correct 
default or wrongly inputted transactions on the chain more easily. Nevertheless, the mone-
tary problems, similar approach can be used if taxation verification necessary in some coun-
tries also locally.   
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5. Redesign of current processes 
5.1 Overall management  
As derived from current knowledge and limited possibilities, lacking protocols and stand-
ards for DLT, the research, experience and tests of other regulators and banks lead to the 
solution that the most efficient solution to all above raised problems would be using pri-
vate/permissioned distributed ledger network available for all applicable stakeholders 
within a region or state/country, with ZKP [52], allowing timestamped and restricted access 
smart contracts. Also, the possibility to read-only relevant public data on private ledger 
available to all according to the law, is a must. The protocol, as mainstay for the system, 
should be managed and planned by the state, which grounds could be used developed with 
the aid of specialists or selecting among existing protocols, supporting above tactic, such as 
for instance Corda. To interact with the different stakeholders and ledgers, the application 
layer (here also depending on the activity named also verification and control layer) would 
be joined with numerous other mutually trusted pertinent systems (FIU cooperation, regu-
lators, users). The utmost different approach from current one is that due to the knowledge, 
cooperation and larger scope available for states, the current bank’s role as a gatekeeper in 
AML/CTF would, in re-designed process with the abilities of advanced technology and 
stemming state’s risks at stake, be shifted to the state’s authority. State, in the form of super 
user would handle together with its relevant entities (registries, FSA, FIU, etc) region’s ac-
cess granting and user management depending on the partakers license and supervisory, 
identity verification (KYC, CDD) of their citizens and local companies with their UBO/BO 
and automatic pre-transaction analyze. For this, the permissioned DLT would be in con-
formity with current banking security regulations and trust issue, as administration rights 
and responsibility over data validation are more visible and countable in the contrary to the 
public distributed ledger where “no legal entity owns or controls the ledger” [30, 12]. Where 
relevant and scalable, blockchain could be used with interoperability possibilities for control 
and data retrieval from other type of ledgers. 
The private and corporate customers and their UBO/BOs data, to the extent mandatory by 
the law, would be required to keep available to public and therefore visible from the public 
part of the private distributed ledger sustained by the state or state appointed controller.  
Legal obligations stemming from the law are of the public interest and therefore in this case 
the data protection regarding retention will be not that stringent and therefore could be man-
aged with private blockchain. If not, this requires with future changes in legal demands the 
storage of chronological history and hence such data should be also stored with timestamp-
ing and approved by BO, company and respective authority.  The private data as agreements 
and counterparties verifications would be kept on private smart contracts, which content can 
be changed when necessary. To the latter information the client with the permission of its 
counterparty would allow access to the bank directly and relevant local FIU (directly or via 
control layer) upon establishing the business relations. The customer’s and bank’s part of 
the public DLT ledger would be managed with the relevant (public) code with public and 
private key match that allows all parties access for verifications and a specific support from 
the managing state would be provided for participants.  
The state can also use the existing ledgers parallel to DLT ledgers and run its data all through 
control/verification layer, whichever is currently necessary. In enhancing current approach 
of KYC, AML/CTF, CRS and FATCA reporting besides banking institutions also other 
participants future rights and obligations are taken in account. The latter are for clients the 
data protection related retention or amend of data, for states/regions the following of the 
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FATF imposed standards (recommendations, methods, procedures) [72] and related upcom-
ing requirements of the European 5th directive of Anti-Money Laundering [71] of establish-
ing local centralised bank account (similar to real estate) and UBO registries, for FIUs 
broadened interaction and exchange of information and for banks the enhanced checks on 
transfers to countries not following sanctions. These redesigned processes necessitate non-
corrupt supervisor access, control and prompt interference mechanisms over possibly shady 
or tendency to dishonesty states and/or their participating institutions/authorities.  
The future secure interactions of centralized and counter trusted public ledger would also 
aid diminishing possibility of corruption in places the corruption of state authorities cannot 
be avoided. For instance, the global projects like ID2020 (for privates and their micro en-
terprises) the identity verifier would take, at least partly, the role typically handled by state 
(verification, managing the registry), allowing legal business and funds, via interactions 
with agreeing authorities’ private ledgers, into places presently constrained for political or 
governing reasons.    
5.2 Re-designed KYC reporting 
The planned dependencies of the new KYC procedure are outlaid on Figure 6.  Firstly, the 
data appearance or change necessary according to the law is governed.  
 
 Figure 6. KYC dependencies with DLT 
Each private or corporate customer (including banks, but in more elaborate and reticent way) 
has different type of legally obligated data stowed on the register, of which legally required 
and verified content is seeable to all. Entering such data is triggered by numerous acts, from 
birth to establishing or selling a company. Triggering event related data is entered the ledger 
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by either party, depending on the event. The customer accesses the state managed ledger via 
application layer identifying itself with applicable public and private codes. Subsequently 
the verification layer collects and analyses existing data on the customer in the state different 
authorities ledgers and verifies this data with relevant authorities joined separately with the 
ledger (for example tax authority, state managed license issuers, FSA, FIU, police, locally 
approved necessary watchlists) or contracting parties (such as LEI issuers, bank, notary) via 
the verification layer with the state and notifies both customer and relevant participants of 
found and unresolved mismatches automatically. The customer verification of data is con-
sidered any term of self-certification required according to the law. For minors the verifica-
tion control is done by parents or state proxy, if so sated in the local law. The matching alert 
data received via watchlists about the privates, corporates or their business area (target busi-
ness, proliferation) or agenda, analyzed by the state relevant authorities prior to the final 
approval and outcome with findings kept on the private part of the state ledger accessible 
according to the relevant contracts to the international FIUs, courts and other pertinent in-
stitutions. Comparable analyses and information should be obtainable for other FIUs during 
the FATF initiated cooperation.  
The more number of participating stakeholders are connected to the verification layer or 
state managed ledger directly, the better the quality of the public data on the customer. After 
the mismatches are cleared with the help and proof of authorities and customer, only the 
necessary data of the customer is made public (all enterers possess reading rights). The cus-
tomer carries the obligation to keep its data updated at least one a year and inform the state 
authority when the trigger requesting a change is on the customer’s side during that period. 
The verification layer informs automatically customer of upcoming yearly update or of any 
authority raised alteration on its data on the public ledger and the customer is required to 
either accept or reject the above change informing via application layer the state authority. 
The latter is reliable of checking, storing and publishing, if required, this verified data cor-
rectly and on time. Both, the customer, and state have identical verified data, all other data 
at state’s disposal may not need verification from the customer. After the customer applies 
for the bank account and approves the bank’s access to its public and applicable private data 
existing only on smart contracts, the bank can assess the suitability of the customer and 
accompanying risks. If the data of the potential customer is not approved by relevant public 
authority, the bank is allowed to access particular customer’s banking related data via ap-
plication layer from the local authority for clarification. The latter is necessary also if the 
customer and bank do not belong to the same region/state. All not public data between the 
authority, client and/or the bank are shared on the smart contract accessible only to parties 
with such permission and stored on parties’ ledgers. The control layer in KYC process is 
linked also to the AML/CTF control layer screening the watchlists and spotting the fraud on 
Figure 7, to avoid criminals using the state’s structures.  
This proposed approach would benefit all the stakeholders within the joined states and re-
gions to possess always the updated unified KYC data in timesaving and data protective 
manner and to help avoid global criminals slide-in and legalize their fraudulent acts and 
funds victimizing and damaging the state’s economy. The more regions or states, directly 
or through trusted 3rd parties, are united in this consortium, the more scalable and advanta-
geous this approach is. Regular yearly updates would also serve the necessary CDD require-
ment. EDD, necessary to perform on high-risk customers, could be done even more fre-
quently and to manage it in accordance with the FATF recommendations, the state/region 
should oblige and notify via verification layer the riskier customers (according to person 
related, business, geographic, jurisdictional or technical compliance [73] area) to update 
their data once per half-year. Besides above this process allows relevant authority to receive 
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automatic knowledge on declined customer relations, terminated accounts and its reasoning, 
currently handled under regulatory reporting on consumer protection, credits and liquidity. 
With more specific and correspondingly private data, this KYC approach could be also used 
for fintech payment service providers (PSP), commercial banks and their due diligence, cur-
rently implemented together with payment system by Ripple [68]. 
5.3 Re-designed AML/CTF reporting 
According to the deliberately not revealed and often guessed statistic on the actual number 
of funds being laundered, used for terrorism or financing (proliferation) weapons of mass 
destruction, and how many of these fraudulent acts and funds are actually being prosecuted 
and seized, is ambiguous. Consequently, the idea that needs to be addressed is by what 
means to prevent these delinquencies in the first place, prior the funds have been transferred, 
as this would avert the possibility that the region is used for illegitimate financial activities. 
The below tactic, shown of Figure 7, enacts in the broadening scope of executing payments 
the similar potential of regionally unified pre-emptive actions and countermeasures as is 
accomplished in the commonly acknowledged medical prescription delivery process. Hence 
the data, besides public KYC data, shared in this process necessitates more restraint line 
guaranteed by the permissioned distributed ledger. 
 
Figure 7. AML/CTF external reporting dependencies with DLT 
Firstly, the state (ideally together with their colleague authorities and regulators from other 
countries) managing the ledger, through its relevant authority (usually consortium of 
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FIUs/police with possibility to localize and specify the requirements) imposes the scenarios, 
watchlists and relevant data onto the control layer. For each bank the control level is adapt-
able stemming from their risk appetite agreed prior with the applicable authorities. Sec-
ondly, the customer submits the payment order, triggered by the smart contract (or any other 
means, if applicable) indicating that the payable service is provided and received, and proof 
of funds available in the smart contract, through the control layer to the bank/PSP. If the 
customer has changed the data in the smart contract, the control layer can automatically 
check it upon the customer's payment order. The customer’s order is made via application 
layer and it passes the control layer, where the state authority automatically screens, moni-
tors, swiftly analyses and releases lawful funds already before the payment order reaches 
the bank for execution. If the customer orders the bank or PSP to initiate the payment, the 
service provider can initiate the order for the customer and keep the above process. Same 
approach will apply to incoming payments. The outcome of the latter is automatic analyse 
of lawfulness, assessed risk and mitigation suggestions of the particular transaction, its con-
tent, parties, and assets taking into account risks regarding customer’s behaviour and the 
sanctions imposed on the receivable country/region, recipient or customer personal or busi-
ness area. Thirdly, the bank obtains order via control layer together with a risk evaluation 
notice (outcome of the automatic analyse) in the form of smart contract not accessible to 
customer and weighs these risks automatically with alerts upon non-conformity with bank’s 
risk appetize, internal instructions, controls and either via the application layer executes the 
transfer or rejects it. If the payment is executed despite of state’s restrictive notice, the FIU 
automatically receives such alert together with all necessary documents and proof. If bank 
decides, on the proven risk grounds to blocks the funds or account, the control layer is noti-
fied automatically. The control layer content with transaction data with applicable smart 
contracts is accessible only to the state authority and to their controllers. In this way the 
control layer is a source of data with payment orders via banks or any other kind of current 
or future service providers whether executed or not together with attempts of possibly fraud-
ulent transfers to pinpoint or foresee the pattern. This tactic, although probably slowing 
down the instant payments could limit the control being executed only once (if all parties 
are joined), would able to point and seize the illegal funds prior their transfer, stop usage of 
accounts used for money-laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation and save funds for 
detecting illegal funds post-action as currently.  
To guarantee the secrecy necessary for AML/CTF related investigations, the customer, by 
giving the access for authorities and applicable bank/PSP into its smart contracts, should not 
see exactly which authority has accessed the data. For the bank/PSP or FIU this proof of 
control is demanded for the audit trail. With new tactics, FATF’s, through stated methodol-
ogy for technical compliance [79], highest goal to protect the economy overall and not to 
limit only with financial institutions, would be reachable to much higher level than currently 
where the state is as money-laundering proof as its weakest capability bank.  
Privacy protection in regions where the AML/CTF controls are not inserted into the local 
law or the supervisors or regulatory are not considered trustworthy, the AML process could 
be also solved as proposed by the Finextra [42] that allows the customers evaluated by the 
respected regulatory or organisation (United Nations) to access financial transfers by storing 
all executed transactions, contracts and funds proof data onto its own digital wallet, so all 
permissioned institutions, could access and asses the customer according to that. This case 
entails the risk of the customer being able to hide/delete/not insert all transaction data into 
the wallet. 
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The same risk, that some corrupt FIU may taint or manipulate data or legalise illegal data 
on the control layer, is also possible, but to guarantee the required line of defences in com-
pliance and to avoid overruling or misuse of power and leakage of methods or investigated 
data in AML/CTF reporting, the local FSAs, controlled by their cross-border supervisor 
authorities, should have access to FIU’s and PSP/bank’s transaction-related analyse proof 
and existing procedures as visible in the Figure 8. In the light of 5th AML Directive require-
ment for cross-border cooperation, this approach would enable it for FIUs, the regulatory 
and supervisory level and have admittance to pertinent data.  
 
Figure 8. AML/CTF control layers and participants interaction dependencies among differ-
ent regulatory areas with DLT 
With the technology offering more easier possibilities, the future of the payment services 
would most likely shift to specialised service providers or even direct peer-to-peer payments 
outside banks and this system would allow integrating all participants and their payments as 
well already from their beginning would also be transferred via control layer.  
5.4 FATCA to be 
FATCA tax reporting for financial institutions was founded as a mean to discover and con-
trol over the U.S. customers hiding their taxable income worldwide behind the complicated 
net of assets and companies with danger to withhold 30% taxes on every not-joined financial 
institution’ U.S. originated payments.  
In redesigned process on Figure 9, the control layer, held by the state as in the AML/CTF 
redesign Figure 7 and verification layer in KYC redesign Figure 6, detects besides watchlists 
incentives also variables related to US (pointers) - data on US indicia on the customer and 
their BOs from KYC process and US origin payments not verified in the smart contract by 
the valid IRS forms. This allows to point customers with US taxable funds and verify the 
account balance, type and status from the smart contract held by the bank on that customer. 
34 
 
The same smart contracts would be held by the customer for the further tax purposes and 
proof or permissioned access by tax advisor, accountant or previous or new tax residence 
tax authority. Similar is held if the US indicia is being dropped and customer or its funds 
are no longer reportable/with-holdable according to FATCA. 
Tax authority accesses via application layer the above public data and other tax related data 
on the customer within its jurisdiction upon provided access to pertinent smart contracts by 
the customer or according to the law from bank and concludes and transfers the report to 
IRS automatically. Bank’s internal database should notify automatically local tax authority 
via application layer of any U.S. indicia not incorporated to KYC process (phone, e-mail) 
found during the customer relationship, so the tax authority can control if this info should 
lead to withholding of the funds. Upon such outcome the tax authority informs automatically 
via application layer all banks the customer and companies where s/he is BO have the ac-
count with to the conditions (every or just U.S. receivables, tax rate) of withholding and 
transferring the tax. 
 
Figure 9. FATCA external reporting dependencies with DLT 
This approach would elevate the global interaction in tax collecting and aid handling with 
discrepancies accompanied with double-triple taxation. Tax authority executes this directly 
within its jurisdiction and to relevant tax authorities for pass-on to banks they control, ac-
cording to their cooperation and information change channels more swiftly than currently. 
For such customers an applicable smart contract on their payments originated from U.S. or 
relevant interests, dividends or other taxable funds, would be held in a smart contract in the 
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same way as the one kept on the above stated account status. Similar process would be 
initiated and relevant banks informed if any state authority directly or via tax authority in-
vestigates that the customer is no longer reportable to IRS due to any reason. Same release 
could be given directly to all relevant tax authorities by IRS if the latter accesses customer’s 
smart contract and approves the customer bank’s approval to the content regarding customer 
type, account balance and status.  
Above tactics on Figure 9 would be effectual for so called new customers (from 2014).  In 
case the U.S. indicia appears through any means on the pre- 2014 customers, the similar 
approach as above could be imposed regardless of the threshold and increase the tax receiv-
ables of U.S. Currently only those pre-2014 accounts that on certain year end raise above 
stated threshold should be controlled for U.S. indicia and reported.  
Renewed process shifts the gatekeeper role to tax authorities, automates the control and 
diminishes the presenting and transferring of false or multiple reports from different coun-
tries and banks. This allows closer cross-border cooperation among different tax authorities 
to pinpoint, analyse and withhold the funds of exactly relevant persons avoiding taxes not 
only related to U.S., but also other countries as shown below in CRS process restructure.   
5.5 CRS to be 
Likewise FATCA, the tax CRS/OECD reporting bears in mind the same purpose – more 
accurate tax payments and pinpointing the tax evaders, but without tax collective require-
ment and punitive charges for non-followers.  
 
Figure 10. CRS external reporting dependencies with DLT 
CRS depends on financial institutions detecting reportable accounts, collecting, verifying 
and reporting the data to local tax authority for analyze and transfer to applicable country’s 
36 
 
authority. Currently the bank can trust the client to some extent and accept their provided 
data on their confirmations on residency, BOs and their data.  
In this renewed approach on Figure 10, the states through its respective authorities, take the 
matter in their hands, verify, similarly to KYC (Figure 6) and AML/CTF (Figure 7) renewed 
reporting through control layer all relevant customer, relevant smart contracts and BOs data 
at their disposal, limiting current fabrications and abuse of the state economy. Unlike the 
banks, the state has more information on what services their citizens/companies use to pin-
point their genuine residency and whether this is actually their citizen who is taxable. State 
can identify and prevent also other ways of masking the true residency with much more ease 
than banks currently and adapt swiftly if the thresholds for BO’s are altered.  
Similar method can be utilised in other regulatory reporting like bank’s Comprehensive 
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).  This could be unified with FATCA for the more 
approachable system worldwide, especially taking account how costly the collection and 
reporting is, the new approach could join more countries with lesser demands. This approach 
abeles adjusting the current standard to more modern and changing world and aid to combat 
tax evasion to the better extent. Applicable also to insurance companies, investment 
schemes, to prevent pension and other social benefit double payouts depending on the resi-
dence of the customer and its investments, suffocate the tax heaven’s approaches of masking 
identity of customers, finding taxpayers falling using the loopholes (trust, holdings) allow-
ing avoiding the taxation of investments into cryptocurrency in tax residence country where 
this is not allowed.  
Therefore, the most efficient way to utilize this reporting goal is to shift as in previous pro-
cesses, the first verification proof to the interaction of customer and their residency state 
authorities and their cross-border cooperation. This enlarges the states’ knowledge of their 
citizens, their businesses, the non-residents living or engaging in commercial activities, pos-
sibilities for real-data analyses for enhancing the business environment within the region 
and of course tax receivables when similar approach is used towards local privates and com-
panies for tax control. 
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6. Discussion 
The root for this thesis is grounded in the actual need to comfort vastly growing mandatory 
reporting’s impact on banks who provide informational aid, an origin from the past limited 
possibilities of technology, to the police, tax and state other investigating authorities. The 
aim of current reporting to states, achieved due to the availability of transactions info within 
and better means to influence the client to provide necessary information to banks, is helping 
to check cross-border taxpayers reported dues and spot criminal financial transfers.  
To accomplish the latter, high quality data is required from the customer by every bank 
separately. Only some new requirements allow banks simply to rely on client’s confirma-
tion, while the rest of clients’ credentials and activities necessitates continuous verification 
from different parties and databases, analyse and assessment of possible risks accompanied 
with servicing each customer to mitigate and keep residue risk on the level acceptable to 
bank and its regulating state(s). The outcome of this process is apparently diverse for every 
bank and their reports, as accessible data on client and its transfers as a whole, is limited. 
The availability of unified verified data would permit assessments being more in line with 
the customer’s actual risk level in particular state/region, be relieving for the customer in 
communication and document exchange and benefit the state in knowing their citizens, busi-
nesses and organising safer and secure financial environment.  
Possibilities of DLT and its sub-categories 
Hence the available potentials and impediments of DLT and its subcategories, to overcome 
the existing issues with communication, verification, analyse and reporting between per-
sons, institutions and relevant ledgers, were studied. The analysed possibilities of DLT, in 
whatever future or existing form, blockchain, Hashgraph, Tangle or other public or peer-to 
peer private ledgers efficient for transactions performing, is fairly novel, technical profi-
ciency and actual steps particularly in KYC, AML/CTF and tax reporting area is rare and 
willingness to execute could be tainted due to problems with bitcoin, trust and cost. None-
theless, many introduced standardisation initiatives [92; 93], prodigious examples in con-
sortiums of authorities, technology companies and banks (Ubin, Corda), securities payments 
and trade finance, should encourage to study DLT’s potentials to improve and minimise 
current risks in tax evasion and criminal activities states face through banks. DLT strengths 
– handling verification through public key cryptography, approving private and alterable 
data on smart contract with timestamps and fingerprinting hash, organising own governance 
protocols and standards for permissioned ledgers, attaching current ledgers with DLT ledg-
ers, using, storing and sharing that in any format efficiently with ZKP protocols, automatic 
controls, easy access via different purpose layers, resilience for malicious partakers in con-
trary with public blockchain approach, interaction with other/controlling regulators and 
ledgers – could aid to reach the goal of consortium of non-corrupt jurisdictions and regula-
tors to join knowledge and forces as gatekeepers in combating the related crime on spot. 
The latter is possible when a trustworthy digital infrastructure with built-in control mecha-
nism for regulators’ is created for local and global interactions as shown in Figure 8.  
Reasoning  
With technology driven inventions and related global services rise, current control or veri-
fications methods will not serve us well in the near future. The state’s strength to combat 
money-laundering, evaluated continuously by FATF, is as durable as its weakest bank’s 
capabilities allow. As the technology develops, new payment possibilities emerge, the states 
face broadened impacts of money-laundering and tax evasion, hence new means to control 
their region must be advanced. At first, when analysing, would the possibilities of DLT 
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relive compliance problems in generating and presenting the required reports, the idea was 
not automation of analysing and presenting the reports as is also possible now but giving 
the state’s particular authority the access to certain data directly after the state, according to 
FATF, distinguishes all accounts its every citizen or company has. But stemming from the 
data circle, which begins (ID, opening company) and ends (SAR, prosecution) with the state 
authority, but requires banks analyse in between, led to the idea to utilise the DLT features 
of interoperability with different types of ledgers, secure vaults, trust, access and perfor-
mance control, smart contracts triggering activities, not depending on not-known partici-
pants, and allow shifting fraud controls back to the authorities.  
Redesigned approach 
As the current banking system requires protection of its secrecy, the most efficient approach 
to all problems at stake would be using private distributed ledger network available for all 
applicable stakeholders within a region or state/country, with ZKP [52], allowing 
timestamped and restricted access smart contracts. The ecosystems protocol, as mainstay, 
should be managed (founding, content, maintaining, access control) by the state supporting 
local difference taking in mind the interoperability necessities with numerous types of local 
and cross-border ledgers and partakers, if willing, using existing protocols as for instance 
Corda.  
New ecosystem should firstly utilise the existing information, on private and corporate cus-
tomers in the different local authorities’ current databases, structural incorporation to the 
state managed permissioned ledger. This data, verified by the state securely, privately (with 
public key or any future cryptography) and directly with particular customer joining this 
ledger via application, requires approved protocol for its future use, access and release as 
shown on Figure 6. Legally public information should stay available in a regular updated 
form (on blockchain) to all as is currently in most countries, but in a verified form, so all 
banks, PSPs and other companies requiring authentication and know-their-customers (uni-
fied KYC), could rely on that and therefore encourage opening market for new opportuni-
ties. The private data on customer, available to customer’s/state’s permitted institutions, 
should be reserved in smart contracts, verified with ZKP protocol among necessary coun-
terparties, stored and timestamped as this permits necessary future alteration of information, 
retention for data protection and executing automatically essential payments not easily done 
on blockchain.  
Every bank/PSP within its licence region should be linked to the ecosystem via application 
layer, which allows swift access to only relevant customer verified data, assess accompanied 
risks and mitigate them consequently. When the states know their citizens and corporations 
bank account numbers, the automatic notification to customer all banks and relevant smart 
contract control would provide always up-to-date data, eliminate current dated and post-act 
reporting and aid the tax handling. For instance, upon changes in tax residency, information 
that the customer is not filing or paying taxes and other data that could influence the neces-
sary reporting, the authority can control that directly from special access smart contracts 
kept by the customer and/or the bank/PSP and may initiate tax transfer with applicable smart 
contract. Latter approach, shown on Figure 9 and Figure 10, would ease any type of tax 
collection, diminish double taxation issues and transferral of actually unnecessary data on 
persons who obey the law and concentrate on those who don’t. 
For customer, this way allows to fill in only one unified KYC in one state/region and keep 
it contents regularly updated as CDD, with verification from the agreed local authorities. 
Customers can use public KYC information also in their business activities, having better 
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control and automatization of paying for provided services, products or taxes via smart con-
tracts and aid in this way preventing crime. They can use this data for their own audit trail, 
efficient their interactions and automate required reporting with tax authorities. Persons, 
which residence or birth country does not allow or afford digital identification, could, if 
ecosystems interoperability and state’s risk tolerance allow, verify their identity through 
other secure and trustworthy global initiatives as ID2020, opening the reach to digital bank-
ing services of other regions.  
Control layer 
As to combating money laundering, the gatekeeper’s role would be also in state’s hand as 
depicted in Figure 7. Prior reaching the bank or service provider, all initiated customer pay-
ments would be filtered/screened via control layer handled by the consortium of authori-
ties/FIUs, taken also into account customer’s previous transaction behaviour. Control 
layer’s content could be altered by states or regions due to upcoming laws, spotted trends, 
investigated crimes or similar required for crime prevention. Automatic result of the control 
layer analyses on customer’s business data on public ledger and on accessible smart con-
tracts, providing automated risk evaluation for the bank in deciding execution or rejection 
of the payment. The control layer screens the payment once – from order to execution, in-
stead of current multiple screening and monitoring, and on existence of legal grounds, orders 
the bank to block or freeze the suspicious funds or automatically follow or trace back their 
movement with aid of other authorities/FIUs in global network.   
This method allows the authorities and their supervisors executing control function, to par-
take direct overview of all payments related risks the state bears through its governed banks 
and their RBA stemming actions and investigate oddities and block/freeze funds on spot in 
both ways. States and regions joining the forces and know-how, just as encouraged by 
FATF, on implementing the common scenarios and hence be able to rely on trusted state’s 
evaluation on particular customer or transaction, would efficient the current situation where 
every bank implements its own approach, control, screen and filter pre-act and monitor post-
act and notify the FIU on its choice.   
Most likely the false alerts created by current post-act monitoring tools of separate banks 
would be diminished in new pre-act joined screening-monitoring done with new technology 
possibilities, with broader knowledge and experience by the actual gatekeeper of the finan-
cial society and economy. This approach will effectuate also finding and closing current 
loopholes, spotting hot-spots and trends, predicting future development and to catch the 
funds and criminals on spot with evidence and money. This approach aids the states to define 
their RBA, consolidate and harmonise it with global governmental and banking sector with-
out limiting banks to be with similar RBA within one region. With trustful party’s verifica-
tion, the cross-border banking would be as efficient and trusted as currently local.  
This would encourage not only the cross-border interactions of regulators, but also busi-
nesses and banks resourcing the direct profit to all counterparties. The quality and quantity 
of current reports stem from the bank’s monitoring regulations, past fears and possibilities 
– this would be also mitigated with proposed slant. Comparable approach can be used to 
any future new payment means as well. This process would also aid replacing other current 
mandatory reporting, such as termination of accounts with reasoning, loan/collat-
eral/card/fraud/incidents reporting with automated notifications and would support enact-
ments in other area challenges like consumer protection, risk transformation and structural 
reform.  
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Compliance and funding 
The core risk management should be incorporated directly into the protocol, providing au-
tomatic compliance control. With the aid of new advanced technology and access to certain 
data, the gatekeeper’s role in new ecosystem for customer’s identification, transfer and as-
sets handling with accompanied fraud control and possibilities to interact to pre-agreed ex-
tent with similar ones globally, presumably achieved in non-corrupt environment without 
any secret back-doors, allows states to be engaged in the 1st line of defence, rather than 
current “4th line” - being the last resource after the banks have exploited all their inside 3 
lines of defences. To avoid misuse of accumulated of power, the controlling regulators in 
consortium or in cross-border rotational and selected way, as now auditors, would serve as 
the 2nd line.  
The funds on implementing the over-regional monitoring system, taken into consideration 
the possibility to use current collected punishment fines to aid the development, would be 
covered with licence/regulators fees. When combining forces, its costs would prospectively 
be lesser than currently, where every bank bears those costs according to their RBA, hence 
the outcome of SARs is uneven in quality, prevents the actual criminals to be spotted and 
puts the whole country at risk. FIUs when joining forces with the aid of new technology, 
would also diminish their expenses and raise the result of catching funds and prosecuting 
criminals. One way to handle the question of current fines would be imposing them directly 
to the states and banks/PSPs who do not follow strong above anti-fraud DLT protocol or do 
not verify their citizens data correctly or miss stopping and freezing obvious criminal funds 
via control layer.  
Future 
DLT with its subcategories is quite raw to execute without further research from technolog-
ical, security, and interoperability point of view. Control layer management technology sep-
arately and together with smart contract protocol, that regulates its validating and readability 
across borders, requires research and development. The more technical side knows of the 
problems and requirements accompanying financial institutions, the more tailor-made ver-
sions of DLT and other technologies interoperability possibilities will emerge. The regula-
tors and authorities’ knowledge on options efficient the state’s risk resistance with DLT 
should rise after projects now in practice or in testing, reveal analysed outcome of results.  
The additional questions open are from partakers willingness to analyse the probable change 
of current set-up, the possibilities and development of secure, scalable and confidentiality 
technology allowing efficiently prevented fraud, to utilisation of current systems and in-
teroperability options with major partakers. If these all are successful, then finding the suit-
able and efficient consensus for selected protocols and standards (legal, technology) will be 
the next big challenge to face.  
Most likely arising technologies like DLT will soon change all present banking system and 
therefore already now, the states joining forces in regions, should analyse the advantages 
the technology provides, study their options of cooperation with peers, technology experts 
and banks and take knowing-their-citizens, their businesses and companies with possibility 
for on-spot crime detection of transactions, more closely into their hands for safer and se-
curer forthcoming financial opportunities. 
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7. Conclusions 
Mapping of the banking institution’s current processes in customer related mandatory re-
porting obligations stemming from the related dependencies for verification, screening and 
monitoring of transactions to spot suspicious and unusual activities, pictured an obvious 
pattern of difficulties, experienced by numerous credit institutions and their customers. To 
overcome these obstacles with the help of emerging technologies, several options were ex-
plored, how distributed ledger and its sub-category technologies could, in different types, 
be utilised.  
Analyse of the distributed ledger technology’s opportunities visible from existing projects 
and researches, lead to the most idealistic and probably efficient way to handle such inter-
actions and prevent money laundering, terrorist financing and tax fraud within one or many 
regulative areas. Nevertheless, this is an option only when the technology and its soundness 
allow permissioned distributed ledger’s gatekeeper’s role, in verifying trustworthily the 
identity and other legally required data for customer and evaluative pre-transaction swift yet 
efficient screening control, to be shifted from banks to state authorities.  
The proposed ecosystem would allow, if founded, contented and managed by cooperation 
of FIUs and/or respective authorities, under regulators control, within or cross-state, signif-
icant diminishment of any type of transaction related to tax evasion or money-laundering 
and participants time consummation and workload of necessary interaction for providing, 
analysing and reporting relevant data.  Consequently, the same approach would presumably 
improve customer experience, its data quality, reduce its unnecessary multiplications and 
use, able execution of data protection related obligations and revert current active reporting 
by banks into pointed-to-know basis passive sharing. With unison management under reg-
ulators and FIUs cooperation protocols the aim of preventing money laundering and related 
illicit transactions within payment service providers of joined states is very likely to be 
achieved. 
The further research opportunities of this approach are vast. From investigating, developing 
and testing standards and protocols of technology (including smart contracts), technical so-
lution for managing the control layer, security and possibilities of interoperability with var-
ious types of existing and future ledgers, and payment services, studying political will and 
willingness of authorities to cooperate and fight crime with broader technological approach.  
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